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Much of  the conventional wisdom in ice hockey suggests that moving the puck forward, 
towards the opponent's goal, is the best strategy for producing scoring chances.   
 
Past research has lent credence to this wisdom.  Studies have consistently shown that 
scoring chances in hockey are produced from fast attacks and short possessions of  less 
than 10 seconds.   
 
Thus, many coaches the world over preach a brand of  hockey that sacrifices puck 
control for constant forward motion.  As a consequence, hockey is often reduced to a 
game of  Pong – teams exchange the puck back and forth until someone commits a fatal 
error and a goal is scored.   
 
Previous studies have given only a partial picture of  the nature of  scoring chances.  They 
have implied that the production of  a chance is dependent only on the possession 
immediately prior to that chance. 
 
This study will expand on the earlier research by examining the ten possessions prior to 
a scoring chance, and how they affect the production of  that chance.  
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1  Introduction
In a 2009 New Yorker magazine article, author Malcolm Gladwell wrote:
In the Biblical story of  David and Goliath, David initially 
put  on  a  coat  of  mail  and  a  brass  helmet  and  girded 
himself  with  a  sword:  he  prepared  to  wage  a 
conventional battle of  swords against Goliath. But then 
he stopped. “I cannot walk in these, for I am unused to 
it,” he said. . . and picked up those five smooth stones. 
What happens when the underdogs likewise acknowledge 
their  weakness and choose  an unconventional  strategy? 
When underdogs choose not to play by Goliath’s rules, 
they win.
(Gladwell2009)
Gladwell's  proposition  has  striking  implications  for  our  game.   In  a  standard  hockey 
match, where both coaches implore their players to move forward, always forward, as quickly as 
possible, the bigger, faster, stronger team will always have a better chance of  winning.  Keeping 
possession of  the puck, and directing the play away from the corners and end-boards may be the 
key to victory for smaller, physically weaker teams.  If  such teams avoid playing the type of  game 
that the big teams want to play, are they more likely to succeed?  Does keeping the puck have any 
impact, positive or negative, on the creation of  scoring chances?
In attempting to answer these questions, this study will review earlier research conducted by the 
International Ice Hockey Centre of  Excellence and others and attempt to build on it, creating a 
more complete picture of  the nature of  a scoring chance.  This study will attempt to quantify 
scoring chances, and length of  possessions in relation to scoring chances.
This paper is organized as follows:  The first section is the introduction.  The second section is 
the theoretical  framework,   which depicts earlier  research in the area of  scoring chances and 
possessions, and offers expert opinions on the nature of  possession and scoring chances.  The 
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third section is  empirical  in  nature and discusses the research problem and research method, 
identifying  data  collection,  methods,  and presenting  the  results  of  this  research.   Finally,  the 
fourth section will review the key results, limitations of  the study, and offer conclusions based on 
the research.
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2      Theoretical framework
This section will define key terms related to this area of  research; review various existing opinions 
of  possession and scoring chances in ice hockey and their origins; and present findings from 
previous research.
2.1   Clarification of  terms
In order to understand the content of  this thesis, it is important to define some key terms, prior 
to delving into the subject at hand.
2.1.1 Possession 
When one team is controlling the puck, that is, it is on the stick of  one of  the players on that 
team, the team is said to be in possession of  the puck.  In a single game of  hockey, the puck changes 
possession many times, and possession of  the puck can be gained in a number of  ways.  A team 
can intercept a pass;  it  can gain the puck through a defensive action (steal the puck from an 
opponent's stick, etc.); it can win a face-off; it can retrieve the puck after a dump-in or a shot on 
goal; or it can gain control of  a loose puck (Saarinen, Mensonen & Small 2009, 15).
Various  estimates  exist  regarding  how  often  possession  changes  in  a  single  game.   Widely 
distributed materials  from the Suomen Jääkiekkoliitto  (SJL)  and the International  Ice  Hockey 
Centre of  Excellence (IIHCE) state that each team gains possession of  the puck approximately 
200  times  per  match  (Alatalo  2005.  30),  and  that  possession  is  generally  distributed  evenly 
between the two teams. Appendix A shows the current model for puck possession and transfer 
between two teams in a game.  
2.1.2  Possession vs dump and chase
Perhaps Possession hockey can best be described in terms of  what it is not.  Possession Hockey is 
the antithesis of  Dump and Chase Hockey.  Dump and Chase, of  course, is a strategy where a 
team  attempts  to  advance  the  puck  into  the  neutral  and  then  the  offensive  zone,  without 
necessarily retaining possession of  the puck.  In a sense, the team makes an investment – it gives 
something (the puck) away in order to regain it later in a more dangerous place on the ice (deep in 
the offensive zone, etc.).  Offensively, this manifests itself  when a team dumps the puck into the 
offensive zone, then pressures the opposing puck carriers as they attempt to breakout, causing 
turnovers in high-percentage scoring areas.  In order to be effective, “the object should not be, 
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however, to give up possession of  the puck, but rather to penetrate the offensive zone with the 
likelihood of  regaining puck control.  Unless this purpose is absolutely clear, you have simply 
given up the puck foolishly”(Perron, Chouinard 1991, 206).  
Dump and Chase can also be used as a defensive maneuver – rather than attempt to breakout of  
their defensive zone with a controlled passing play, a team might use a fast breakout or attempt to 
chip the puck off  the glass and out of  the zone, both of  which “...emphasize the quickness of  
moving  the  puck  out  of  the  defensive  zone  while  sacrificing  –  relatively  speaking  –  certain 
principles of  attack such as puck control” (Perron, Chouinard 1991, 189).  
A Puck Possession team approaches the game in a much different way from a team focused on 
Dumping and Chasing.  Rather than simply dumping the puck away from their own goal and 
towards the opponent's goal, a Puck Possession team aims to retain control of  the puck, even 
when forward progression of  the puck is impeded (Turpin 2007).  Teams can maintain control of  
the puck by aborting and reorganizing their attack, or regrouping.  
2.1.3  Regroup (mid-fast breakout or regroup)
Sometimes, a team elects to abort a forward rush, but maintains control of  the puck by moving 
back (with a pass or by skating) towards their own defensive zone.  If  a puck-carrier finds himself  
approaching the offensive zone with no support from his teammates, or the offensive team is 
outnumbered by defenders as it approaches the offensive blue line, the puck carrier is forced to 
make a decision.  He may choose to continue attacking, and attempt to create a scoring chance 
despite being out numbered by defenders; he might dump the puck behind the defenders, hoping 
to retrieve it  on the forecheck,  deep in enemy territory and with more support;  or  he might 
choose to abort the attack, passing or skating away from the offensive zone in order to maintain 
control of  the puck and reorganize with his linemates (Turpin, 2007).  This final option is known 
as 'regrouping'.  The time and type of  regroup employed is dependent on the situation and the 
puck-carrier.  
In 1976,  sports  researcher  Guy Boulonne analyzed the Russian Red Army team's  regrouping 
tactics  used in the '72 Summit Series  against  Canada.   Boulonne described regrouping as the 
interaction of  a number of  concepts:
4
1. Back-passing and/or carrying the puck back
2. Spreading the defense with one higher than the other
3. Forwards  interchanging,  accelerating  and  developing  good  width 
(lanes) and depth (zones)
4. Isolation with eventual support
5. Improvising to “take” whatever the defense is giving
                        (Boulonne 1976, 16)
2.1.4  Counter-attack
The counter-attack is another form of  transition, moving up ice more quickly than the regroup. 
When a team wins possession of  the puck, the puck carrier must read the situation and decide if  
the puck should immediately be advanced (by skating, passing or dumping) or if  a regroup should 
be initiated (by turning or passing back towards one's own goal).  If  the puck is immediately and 
quickly advanced, this is known as a counter-attack.  
Counter-attacks are important in hockey.  Quick counter-attacks can result in attacking with a 
numerical  advantage.   Indeed,  game analysis  has shown that  at  the Men's  International  level, 
approximately 30% of  goals are created by counter-attacking (Saarinen, Mensonen & Small 2009, 
17).  A good example of  a counter-attack leading to a scoring chance might be a defenseman 
stopping his opponent attacking 3 on 2, then quickly passing the puck up to his teammates, who 
might then be able to attack with their own numerical advantage.  Fast counter-attacks in the 
offensive zone can create scoring chances against a disorganized defense.  The opposite of  this 
fast counter-attack is an organized attack.
2.1.5  Organized attacks
Organized attacks can originate in any of  the three zones of  play.  When the play originates in the 
defensive zone, we will term it a slow or organized breakout.  Slow breakouts usually occur when 
the team with the puck has “enough time to set up a specific play known by all the attacking 
players, most commonly when the forechecking by the opposition is rather unaggressive” (Perron, 
1991, 188).  
2.1.6  Organized attacks, offensive zone
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When a team's initial rush into the Offensive Zone does not produce a shot on goal, the team 
must find another way to organize an attack on net.  As noted by Chouinard and Perron (1991, 
231) “Many initial attacks do not culminate with a shot on net, with the result that you are now 
attempting to redesign a play to attack the net.  You did not lose possession of  the puck; you 
either opted to postpone or were forced to delay the action of  going to the net.”  There many 
different  forms  of  organized  attack  in  the  offensive  zone.   Some include  cycling,  perimeter 
passing and setting up below the goal line (Chouinard 1991, 231-237).
2.1.7  Scoring chance, scoring efficiency, offensive efficiency
The International Ice Hockey Centre of  Excellence has defined and analyzed numerous game 
situations and variables.  Some of  these are:
• Scoring chances – A scoring chance can be defined as a shot taken from a 'dangerous' area 
(the 'scoring area', normally defined as the area directly in front of  the goal and extending 
through the face-off  dots to the top of  the face-off  circles) (Saarinen, Mensonen & Small, 
2009)  on the  ice,  a  shot  on net  combined with the  screening  of  the  goaltender  or a 
deflection,  or a  shot produced from an odd-man rush (3-on-2,  2-on-1,  etc.).   This  is 
different from a shot on goal,  which may be taken from anywhere on the ice,  but is 
unlikely to produce a goal (Walter & Johnston 2009, 53).
• Scoring efficiency –  The number of  goals the team scores divided by the number of  
Scoring Chances (IIHCE 2008, 7).
• Offensive efficiency – The number of  scoring chances divided by the number of  attacks 
from the defensive zone, neutral zone or offensive zone (IIHCE 2008, 7).
2.1.8  Zone – When discussing game situations, the rink is divided into 3 zones, as in figure 1: the 
Offensive Zone (OZ or HA), the Neutral Zone (NZ or KA) and the Defensive Zone (DZ or 
PA).
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Figure 1. The Three Zones of  a Hockey Rink (hockeyiseverything.com 2010)
The zones  are  relative  to the  puck-possessing  team,  so that,  if  a  player  has  the  puck and is 
standing near to his own goaltender and goal, he is said to be in the Defensive Zone.  Of  course, 
his Defensive Zone is his opponent's Offensive Zone.
2.1.9  Transition
Transition can be defined as the moment a team must move from offense to defense or vice-
versa.  This happens many times over the course of  a period, as the puck changes possession 
from  one  team  to  the  other  due  to  steals,  turnovers,  rebounds,  faceoffs  and  other  regular 
occurrences (Perron 1991, 152).
Upon gaining possession of  the puck, a team may either elect to move up the ice quickly, with an 
intentional pass (Fast), regroup and move up ice (Mid-Fast), set up an organized or controlled 
attack (Slow), shoot the puck away into the enemy's Defensive Zone (Dump), or thoughtlessly 
lose the puck (Flipper).  These are the options available to a team in offensive transition.
2.1.10  Undetermined possession phase
The game of  hockey features many moments of  ambiguity; times known as “the 'undetermined 
possession' phase during the game – neither team is in control of  the puck and some players are 
striving to regain possession while others wait to see the outcome.” (Perron 1991, 150).  These 
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phases can occur after a shot and rebound, after a missed pass, a faceoff  or any number of  
unpredictable circumstances.
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2.2  Perspectives on regrouping, counter-attacking and dumping
2.2.1 Regrouping vs counter-attacking
Traditionally, the decision to abort an attack, any attack, has not been widely supported in North 
American hockey circles.  It is generally thought foolish to ever turn back into the neutral zone, 
for fear of  relinquishing the puck closer too your own net.  Better to dump the puck into the 
opponents' zone where, even if  the opposing defensemen recover it, the other team needs to 
attack the full length of  the rink to produce a scoring chance (Johnston 2009).  Thus, North 
American  strategy  has  generally  called  for  a  dump-in,  rather  than  a  regroup.   As  noted  by 
Canadian journalist Justin Bourne, for years, “teams would mount their charge, and if  it was well 
defended, they'd say 'well all right then. Well done. Here it is.  Your turn to take a crack at us'” and 
dump the puck away (Bourne 2010).  A puck possession team, facing the same situation would 
more often opt to keep the puck, and turn back into the neutral or defensive zone in order to 
reconfigure their attack. 
Many hockey scholars credit the classic '72 series between the Soviet Union and Canada with 
introducing more complex neutral zone plays and regroups to the North American hockey scene. 
At that time, North American teams were playing a very linear 
game, with wings staying in their lanes, and centres always in 
the middle of  the ice, much like the old table-hockey games. 
The  Russians  were  very  good  at  controlling  the  puck  with 
their  defensemen  while  their  forwards  skated  to  openings 
laterally  and  diagonally,  organizing  and  executing  an  attack 
with all five players.  Russian players were encouraged to skate 
to any area of  open ice, unconfined by a coach's declaration to 
“stay  in  your  lane”...  In  some  cases,  the  Russians  would 
approach the attacking blue line in possession of  the puck and 
turn back to regroup, hoping to form a better attack (Gendron 
2003, 78).
Despite the success of  the Soviet  system, many well-respected coaches on both sides of  the 
Atlantic Ocean still believe that the puck should always move forward – away from one's own 
goal and towards the opponent's.  In his classic memoir, The Game, Hall of  Fame goaltender Ken 
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Dryden makes his opinions on possession and counter-attacking rather clear:
Hockey is not a  possession game, nor can it ever be [. . .]  A 
possession game is hyperbole.  The puck changes teams more 
than 6 times a minute, more than 120 times a period, more 
than 400 times a game, and  little can be done to prevent it. 
[.  .  .]  It  is  the  nature  of  the  game,  North  American  or 
European.  If  possession is a team's style, it will be frustrated. 
Worse, if  it is attempted, it will make the game cautious and 
predictable (Dryden 1983, 129).
Dryden is not the only one with such strong opinions on the subject.  Following the Olympic 
Men's Hockey Final played between Canada and the US in 2010, Team USA head coach Ron 
Wilson's post-game comments riled many fans, coaches and players in Europe.
The game tonight had so much intensity.  Canada and the 
United States play the game like it should be – not sitting 
back  on  your  heels  and  waiting  for  something  bad  to 
happen  and  counter-punching,  but  actually  going  on  the 
attack [. . . ] I'm teaching [my players] to play the right way; 
not the Slovakian, Czech or Russian way where you sit back 
and wait and wait and wait.  We are on the attack. [. . .] The 
game was invented in Canada and I think we in the United 
States  have  morphed  into  the  same  style  of  play.   It  is 
exactly the way the game should be played (Roarke, 2010).  
2.2.2  Possession vs dumping
Puck possession is power.  The team that has the puck can often dictate the speed, direction and 
nature of  play.  When a defender gains the puck in his own defensive zone, for instance, he may 
skate the puck up ice quickly, he may make a long stretch pass to a teammate, he might make a 
lateral  pass to his  defense partner in an attempt to open up passing options,  he might skate 
behind his own net to set up an organized attack, or he might simply dump the puck out of  the 
zone.  The choice he makes is, of  course, dependent on the game situation and the nature of  the 
pressure he faces from the opposing team, but he, nonetheless, can choose what to do with the 
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puck.  And what he does with the puck will influence the movement of  every other player on the 
ice.  Why, then, might so many teams be in such a hurry to dump or relinquish control of  the 
puck?  As one North American coach explains it:
The answer is fairly simple.  When you are approaching the 
center red line or the attacking blue line and the likelihood 
of  a  successful  entry  is  poor  while  the  likelihood  of  a 
turnover and counter attack by the opponent is high, why 
not  dump it  in?   If  the  puck  is  dumped in,  you  have  a 
chance to get it back.  That's good.  If  the puck is dumped 
in, the opponent has to return it 200 feet to score a goal...If  
the  puck  is  not  dumped in  but  rather  turned  over  to  an 
opponent  who  counter  attacks,  well...that's  not  so  good! 
(Gendron 112.)
So, then,  relinquishing control,  or dumping,  can be a defensive action made by the offensive 
team.  
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2.3   Perspectives on organized breakouts 
2.3.1  Organized breakouts – North America
On the smaller  ice surface (61m x 26m) of  North America (as opposed to the International 
specifications of  61m x 30m) (IIHF 2004),  most teams do not have the opportunity (or the 
desire) to break out slowly during even strength (5-on-5) play as the reduced playing area makes 
aggressive forechecking a common and effective strategy (Lehkonen 2010).  An exception is when 
playing against a trapping defense – the trap often allows or invites the offensive team to break 
out of  its own end, but then clutters up the neutral and high offensive zones, making continued 
forward progress difficult.  A slow or organized breakout allows the offensive team to attack as a 
unit; when done correctly, this can open holes in the opponent's trap.  According to respected 
coaches Ryan Walter and Mike Johnston, the keys to successful slow or organized breakouts are 
“(1)  the four players without the puck move with speed, and (2)  the puck carrier  knows the 
options and picks the best one. In [this] setup, the puck carrier is like a quarterback who knows 
the  routes  of  the  receivers  and  picks  which  option  is  open”  (Walter  & Johnston 2010,  14). 
Despite  the  awareness  of  organized,  slow,  breakout  tactics,  the  North  American  philosophy 
dictates that the puck should spend as little time as possible in your own team's defensive zone.  
“By minimizing  the amount  of  time  spent in  the defensive  zone,  good  
teams reduce the probability of  allowing goals... The ideal situation is to be  
able to get the puck out with either a carry or a pass, perhaps two, so that  
possession  is  maintained  and  the  attack  can  continue.   However,  the  
bottom line  is  to  ensure  that  the  puck gets  out  of  the defensive  zone”  
(Gendron 2006, 63).
2.3.2 Organized breakouts – Europe
The larger European ice surface demands a different forechecking strategy which, in turn, has 
produced a different philosophy on the use of  slow or organized breakouts.  Trapping, or less 
aggressive (1-2-2, 1-4) forchecking systems are much more common in Europe, as teams try to 
prevent 'losing' a forechecker deep in the opposition's zone, as may happen if  a player skates in 
hard, but is beaten with a quick pass up ice.  Due to the sheer size of  the rink, it is easier for puck-
carriers  to  avoid  being  checked  deep  in  the  defensive  zone  (Lehkonen  2010).   In  Finland, 
however, after a dump-in, teams are regularly allowed to collect the puck, make a leisurely line 
change,  and organize their  breakout,  all  with the defensive team standing calmly by,  patiently 
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waiting for the game to resume.  The focus is not necessarily on moving with speed, but rather on 
moving with support and balance.  Teams are not afraid to keep possession in their own defensive 
zone, because, due to the wide rink, smart passing with good support can tire the forechecking 
team, cause breakups in their defensive system, and  widen gaps between defenders and oncoming 
attackers (Pennanen 2010).
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2.4 Existing research on scoring chances and puck possession 
A 2008 study conducted by the International Ice Hockey Centre of  Excellence indicates that most 
attacks (75 out of  125, or 60%) originate in the Defensive Zone (table1) , but only 25% percent 
of  goals are produced from those attacks, as seen in table 2.  Thus, attacks originating in the 
Defensive Zone are not particularly efficient.
Table 1. Zones Where Attacks Begin, Average, Per Team, Per Game (125 Attacks Total)
Zone in Which Attack Originates Quantity of  Attacks
Defensive Zone 75
Neutral Zone 30
Offensive Zone 20
(IIHCE 2008, 2.)
Table 2. Percentage of  Goals Produced
Attack Originates in: Percentage of  All Goals Scored
Defensive Zone 25.00%
Neutral Zone 15.00%
Offensive Zone 25.00%
(IIHCE 2008, 2)
In addition to knowing from where attacks originate, it is important to note how scoring chances, 
and goals, are produced.  Table 3 indicates the manner in which goals were scored in the 2008 
IIHCE study.
Table 3. Type of  Attacks that Produce Goals
How Possession is Gained Percentage of  Goals
Stolen Pucks 40%
Opponent Dump 10%
Rebound 40%
Face Off  Win 10%
(IIHCE 2008, 3)
These statistics indicate that if  we score 5 goals on 125 scoring chances, 3.5 of  those goals, on 
average, will come from only 25 fast counter-attacks.  The remaining 1.5 goals will come from 90 
14
organized attacks.  When viewed in this manner, the statistics seem to indicate that fast counter-
attacks are more efficient at producing goals than organized attacks (table 4).
Table 4. Effectiveness of  Counter-Attacks vs Organized Attacks
Attack Type and Quantity Goals Scored Effectiveness
Counter-Attack 25 3.5 14%
Organized Attack 90 1.5 1.6%
(IIHCE 2008)
Using these statistics, many coaches and experts have come to the conclusion that most scoring 
chances  are  the  result  of  fast  counter-attacks  (Alatalo  2005),  and  they  train  their  teams 
accordingly.
2.4.1   Prior possessions in relation to scoring chances
Other studies by the IIHF and the International Ice Hockey Centre of  Excellence have examined 
the length of  possessions that directly lead to scoring chances. The IIHCE studied attacks at the 
2006 Olympics and 2005 World Championships.  Figure 1 displays the results from their research.
Figure 1. Duration of  Attack in EV and PP Situations, IIHCE
In the study, of  the even strength attacks which produced goals, approximately 72%  lasted less 
than 10 seconds, which would seem to suggest that, at even strength, quick attacks (as in counter 
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attacking) are the most effective.
This research is interesting, but leaves many unanswered questions.  Namely, if  we accept that 
fast  counter-attacks  and  short  possessions  produce  scoring  chances  and  goals,  what 
circumstances produce those fast counter-attacks?  How does a team get into a position where it 
has the opportunity to make a fast attack?
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3 Research problem
The purpose of  this study will be to determine whether the length and ratio of  possession prior 
to a scoring chance (SC) has an effect on the production of  that scoring chance.  The objectives 
of  this study are:
1) To determine the average ratio of  possession in the 10 possessions before a scoring 
chance is produced.
  
2) To determine whether the team producing the scoring chance tends to have the puck for a 
majority (% of  t = >50%) of  the time in the 10 possessions prior to a scoring chance.
3) To determine how manpower (even-strength, power play, penalty kill) affects possession 
ratios prior to a scoring chance.
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4  Research Methods
This study was conducted using video of  4 junior hockey games and recorded data for 1479 team 
possessions, including 2978 successful passes, 189 scoring chances and 20 goals. Each possession 
was  tabulated  using  12  different  categories  which  included  59  variables.   The  Method  was 
designed to 'draw a picture' in numbers of  each possession within the game.  The main focus was 
to measure possession and possession sequences in an attempt to answer the aforementioned 
research questions.
4.1 Collection and handling of  data
DVDs of  13 hockey periods played by the Hämeenlinna Pallo Kerho (HPK)  A and B Junior 
teams (Hämeenlinna, Finland) in 2010 were selected at random.  Each game was watched and its 
data recorded on a data collection sheet.  All games were watched and data collected by the same 
researcher, both in the interest of  producing comparable results, and because only one researcher 
was available.  An Open Office spreadsheet was used to record data, and a standard DVD player 
with remote control used for the playing of  DVDs.  Most possessions were viewed 1-4 times in 
order  to  record  all  necessary  data.   Each  period  averaged  121  total  possessions,  or  60.5 
possessions per team.
Detailed  statistics  were  collected  for  each  HPK  and  opponent  possession,  classifying  each 
possession on the basis of  59 variables grouped into 12 categories.  Categories and variables were 
as follows in table 5:
Table 5. Data collection categories and descriptions
Possession Begins Example:  24.01 (this  indicates the video time rather than 
actual game-clock time, and was only used as a reference 
tool)
Possession # Example:3 -- the home team's 3rd possession of  the period
Zone Gained (See Figure 1.) Zone in which the team took possession of  the puck
Consecutive Passes Number of  passes team executed before losing possession
Possession Time Number of  seconds team possessed the puck
Zone Advance Advance a zone (+), stay in same zone (/) or lose a zone (-) 
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See Figure 1.
Transition Slow, Mid-Fast, Fast, Flipper or Long Dump
Off. Zone Entry? Did team advance into Off. Zone? Y/N
Shot? Did team produce a shot on goal?
Corner Play? Did team set up its offense in the offensive zone? Y/N
Off. Zone Entry Type HOW did  the  team enter  the  Off.  Zone?  Dump,  Carry, 
Pass;  with  man  advantage  (+);  with  even  strength  (/); 
undermanned (-)
Off. Zone Possession What did the team do upon entering the OZ?
Scoring Chance What type of  chance was produced? (ie: rush, cycle, etc.)
A notation was also made to indicate if  the home team was playing at Even Strength, on a Power 
Play, or Penalty Killing.  HPK statistics were recorded in white columns, opponents statistics in 
gray.  
The following table 6.1 is a sample of  the data recorded for seven consecutive possessions in one 
game.  These first six categories indicate the basics of  the possession: which team had the puck, 
in  which  zone  was  possession  gained,  length  of  team's  possession  (in  seconds),  consecutive 
passes before relinquishing possession, was the puck advanced, and type of  transition used.
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Table 6.1 Sample Tabulation of  7 Possessions
The  next  four  categories  (Table  6.2)  concern  the  beginning  of  the  attacking  phase  of  the 
possession.  Did the puck enter the offensive zone, and if  so, was there a shot, or a corner play? 
Finally, an indication of  how the team brought the puck into the offensive zone – was the puck 
carried, passed or dumped, and did the attacking team enter the Offensive Zone with a man-
advantage (+) at even-strength (/) or at a man-disadvantage (-).
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HPKA-Magnitogorsk 12.8.2010
pos begins 113 120 122 132 135 148 151
Poss. # *
1 1 2 2 3 3 4
Zone Gained
HA 1 1
KA 1 1
PA 1 1 1
Consec Passes
# 2 0 3 1 2 1 0
Poss. Time
Sec 6 1 10 2 13 3 1
Zone Ad.
+ 1 1 1
/ 1 1 1
- 1
Transition
Slow
Mid-Fast 1 1
Fast 1
Flipper 1 1 1
Long Dump
Table 6.2 Sample tabulation of  7 possessions
Finally, in Table 6.3, if  the puck did advance into the Offensive Zone, a notation of  the result of  
that  entry:   straight  attack  from  the  rush;  cycling  in  the  corner;  passing  around  the  zone's 
perimeter;  a carry and shot by an individual;  a giveaway or turnover.   If  there was a scoring 
chance, a notation for the type of  chance: straight, powerplay, set attack, a shot followed by a 
rebound, etc.
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OZ Entry?
Y 1 1
N 1 1 1
Shot?
Y 1
N 1 1 1
Corner Pl?
Y
N 1 1 1 1
OZ Entry Type
Dump +
/
- 1
Carry +
/
- 1
Pass +
/
-
Table 6.3. Sample tabulation of  7 possessions
The decision was made to analyze the characteristics of  every scoring chance, not just goals.  It is 
important to note that any analysis of  scoring chances involves some discretion on the part of  
the data collector.  Though there are guidelines regarding what is and is not a scoring chance, 
there are no absolutes.  What one person might classify as a scoring chance, another might discard 
as an  almost chance.  There are occasions, indeed, where there is no actual shot on goal, but a 
scoring chance is still awarded to the offensive team for the simple reason that all of  the aspects 
of  a scoring chance were in place, but a shot did not occur because of  a bad bounce, or a broken 
stick on a shot or another unlucky circumstance.  The offensive team had maneuvered itself  into 
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OZ Poss.
Cycle Low
Cycle High
Below GL
High (DtoD)
Indiv Dangle 1
Perimet passing
Imm.Shot
BlckSht
Unsuc pas to slot
Lose imm.
D2Opp. 1
Flipper Giveaway 1
Scoring Chance
Straight 1
Rebound
EQ
YV
AV
Breakaway
Corner Play
IndivCarry+Shot
Point Shot+Screen
Point Shot +Tip
Gretzky's Office
Rebound
Cross-ice pass 1
D Pinch
Tip
Steal/pass/shot 1
Miss from slot
Middledrive 1
an optimum scoring position, had beaten the defense, but, for one reason or another, the puck 
did not go to the goal.
4.2  Method of  analysis
After the completion of  data collection, the data were analyzed.  For each completed period of  
play, total possession time, undefined possession time, possession time per team, percentage of  
total possession time per team, length of  an average possession, minutes of  total possession per 
team, scoring chances and goals were calculated as in table 7 below.
Table 7. Sample calculation of  one period's possession statistics
Period 3:
Period: 1200s
Total pos: 1093s
Undefined pos: 107s = 1min 47s = 8.9% of  period
HPK pos: 64 pos = 533s = 8.33s/pos = 48.7% of  pos = 8.53mins of  pos 
Magnitogorsk pos: 64 pos = 560s = 8.75s/pos = 51.3% of  pos = 9 mins 20s of  pos
HPK Scoring Chances: 6
HPK Goals: 1
Magnitogorsk Scoring Chances: 8
Magnitogorsk Goals: 2
Next, results for all games were compiled in a database.  Conclusions were drawn with the use of  
this wealth of  data.
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5 Results and discussion
In this study, it appears data regarding goals and scoring chances are similar to those compiled in 
earlier studies, as seen in tables 8, 9 and 10:
Table 8.  Manpower when goals scored
This Study 2006 Men's Olympic Games
Even-Strength 50.0% 58.3%
Power Play 44.4% 33.5%
Short-handed 5.6% 4.9%
(Saarinen, Mensonen & Small 2009, 13)
Table 9.  Type of  attack when goals scored
%  of  All 
Goals  (17 
total)
Even-Strength 
(8 goals)
Power Play 
(8 goals)
Short-handed 
(1 goal)
Counter Attack 35.3% (6) 62.5% (5) 0% (0) 100% (1)
Organized Attack 52.9% (9) 25% (2) 87.5% (7) 0%(0)
Face-Off  Win, 
Shot
11.8% (2) 12.5% (1) 12.5% (1) 0%(0) 
Table 10.  Type of  attack, when goals scored, even-strength only
This Study IIHCE 2007 Study
Counter-Attack 62.5% 70.0%
Organized Attack 25.0% 30.0%
Other 12.5% 0.0%
(IIHCE 2007)
Roughly 65% of  even-strength goals are produced from counter-attacks, while roughly 27% of  
even-strength goals come as the result of  organized attacks.  It would be easy to conclude, then, 
that when playing at even strength, quick counter-attacks are the most efficient way of  scoring. 
These  statistics  on  attacking  efficiency  are,  however,  deceiving.   The  statistics  do  not  give  a 
realistic  picture  of  the  game,  simply  because  they  observe  each  possession  as  a  standalone 
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occurrence.  But a scoring chance is produced by a string of  events, not a single event.  For instance, 
a long, organized possession of  20 seconds or more may not directly produce a scoring chance, 
but it will likely tire and frustrate the defensive team, meaning that when they do gain the puck, 
they are unlikely to be able to mount an effective counter-attack.  Failed counter-attacks often 
result in 'flipper giveaways' (Sihvonen, P. 2009), or quick, thoughtless losses of  puck control.  The 
resulting counter-counter-attack may be more likely to produce a scoring chance.  Thus, although 
the initial organized attack did not directly produce a scoring chance, the counter-attack chance 
that was eventually produced came as a result of  that first organized rush.  A hockey game, unlike 
an American football game, is not stopped and re-set after every change of  possession.  The game 
has flow – action, reaction, re-reaction.  
Imagine this scenario:  two teams are playing at even strength. Team 1 wins a face-off  in their 
own defensive zone, and makes a quick breakout up the ice.  As Team 1's puck-carrying left-
winger approaches the offensive blue line, he recognizes that he is outnumbered by Team 2's 
defenders.  He quickly turns back, and fires a pass to his defenceman, who has followed the play 
up ice.  The defenceman skates backwards drawing Team 2's forecheckers towards him.  He then 
passes diagonally forward and across to his defense partner, who in turn chips the puck off  the 
boards and up to his right-winger, who has come back to support.  The right-winger and centre, 
having gained speed and a new point of  attack from the regroup, now attack an isolated Team 2 
defenceman 2-on-1.  The defenceman makes a desperate play, throwing his body to the ice to stop 
the pass.  The scoring chance is averted.  The puck bounces to the boards, where it is picked up 
by Team 2's backchecking centre.  Tired, the centre attempts to dump the puck out of  the zone, 
only to have it stolen by Team 1's right winger, who sends a hard pass into the slot that is deftly 
deposited in the net by his left-winger.  Goal scored.  
The IIHCE's statistics would call this a goal scored from a steal and counter-attack.  But that 
would  neglect  75%  of  the  story!   The  opportunity  to  counter-attack  against  a  tired  and 
disorganized team was caused by Team 1's previous organized attack.  The circumstances that lead 
to the final moment of  success are of  tremendous importance.  Just as wars do not spontaneously 
break out without any cause or reason, goals and scoring chances do not magically drop from the 
sky.   Goals  are  the result  of  some predicating  action.   It  seems plausible  that  that  action is 
prolonged puck-possession.
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Furthermore,  very  little  separates  a  goal  from a  save  or  a  shot  that  hits  the  goalpost.   By 
examining only goals-scored, and not all scoring chances, we are implying that goals are scored 
from chances that are somehow of  a different quality than those that produce saves or ricochets off  
goalposts.  However, as noted by journalist David Staples, 
... it really hits home that little separates a goal from a great 
save, a scoring chance from a goal.  Most goals are scored 
on the very best of  scoring chances, leaving the goalie with 
little chance of  making a save, but some goals are scored on 
marginal  scoring  chances,  or  on  shots  that  can't  be 
considered scoring chances at all.   There's some luck that 
comes into play here.
(Staples, 2010)
To really understand goal-scoring, then, we need to examine all scoring chances, not just those 
that  produce  goals.   And  to  understand  scoring  chances,  we  need  to  examine  the  string  of  
possessions that produce them.
5.1  Prior research: mistakes in generalization of  data
This study's data  indicate that,  in a  20 minute period,  the puck is  loose (that  is,  not clearly 
possessed by either team) approximately 128 seconds, or 10.7% of  the period.  The rest of  the 
time, one team or the other is in possession of  the puck.  But distribution of  the puck is often 
not equal.  The SJL's Transition diagram claims that each team has the puck approximately 50 
percent of  the time.  But, upon subtracting undefined possession time (when no team has clear 
possession of  the puck), we see, in table 11 that possession percentages can vary between teams 
as much as 15% over the course of  a game.  
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Table 11. Possession differences per team per game
Apparently, the SJL study measured its possession statistics by merely averaging the possession 
percentages for each team in a single game, meaning that the average percentage of  possession 
always appears to be 50%.  This gives the impression that true Possession Hockey is a falacy – 
that, over the course of  a game or the course of  a season, teams will always control the puck for 
roughly equal amounts of  time.  As the statistics above show, however, possession ratios can vary 
wildly from period to period and game to game.
A good example from this study is the game between HPK and Tappara Tampere.  The following 
figure 2 indicates that, over the course of  the game, HPK had possession of  the puck 57.6% of  
the time to Tappara's 42.4%.  This 15.6% difference in possession time translates to 8 minutes 
and 13 seconds of  time with the puck; time that HPK could use to launch multiple attacks, and 
time in which Tappara could not attack at all.
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Tappara
Game # of Pos. Undefined Pos Pos. Time % of Possession % Difference Time Difference
HPK 163
373s = 10.4%
31m 57.60%
15.60% 8m13sTappara 164 22m47s 42.00%
HPK 183
296s = 8.2%
28m20s 51.7%
3.40% 1m46sHIFK 189 26m36s 48.3%
HPK 202
529s = 14.2%
29m42s 55.6%
11.20% 6m0sÄssät 212 23m42s 44.4%
HPK 188
314s = 8.7%
30m03s 54.7%
9.40% 5m20sMagnit. 178 24m43s 45.3%
Figure 2.  Possession percentages in HPK v Tappara.
The possession averages from all three of  the other games (141 scoring chances), also provide 
similar information.
Figure 3. Possession by %, 3 games
In the first game in the chart, HPK versus HIFK, HPK had possession of  the puck for 51.7% of  
the game, to HIFK's 48.3%.  This resulted in only 112 seconds of  extra puck possession for 
HPK, a relatively small amount.  Puck possession in this game was roughly balanced.  In HPK v 
Ässät and HPK v Magnitogorsk, however, the possession scales tilted heavily in HPK's favour.  
Against Ässät, HPK controlled the puck 55.6% of  the total possession time, and Ässät 44.4%. 
Though this is seemingly not a huge difference in possession, it translates into exactly 6 minutes 
of  possession time.  6 minutes extra in which HPK was allowed to control the play.  6 minutes 
extra in which HPK could mount an attack.  6 minutes extra that Ässät had to defend, angle, read 
and react to the movements of  the opponent and the puck.  The numbers were similar in HPK's 
game  against  Metallurg  Magnitogorsk:  HPK's  total  possession  was  54.7%  to  Magnitigorsk's 
45.3%, for a total of  5 minutes 20 seconds more time in possession of  the puck for HPK.
The following table  12 shows further  possession  statistics.   It  lists,  for  each  game,  the  total 
number  of  possessions  per  team,  the  average  length  of  a  single  team possession,  the  total 
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possession time per team per game, and again, the team's total possession percentage:
Table 12.  Possession Times and Averages, 4 Games
The statistics on average time per possession indicate that HPK was not only able to have the 
puck for more total  time per game, but that  each of  its  possessions  were,  on average,  1-1.5 
seconds longer than its opponents'.
5.2  Possessions in relation to scoring chances
In this study's 1479 total possessions, the average lengths of  possession, in seconds, are as follows 
(table 13).
Table 13. Average, median and mode of  possession (in seconds)
Each possession lasted, on average, 8.81 seconds.  The median possession was six seconds, and 
the mode, or most common length of  a possession, was only 1 second.  This very low mode time 
is  likely  due  to  the  high-speed  nature  of  hockey.   As  much  as  a  team might  want  to  have 
possession all the time, it is simply not possible with 12 players on the ice, 10 of  whom are always 
in motion.  Possessions in general are, however, quite different statistically from possessions that 
produce scoring chances, as depicted in figure 4.
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Game # of PossessionsAvg time/Pos. Total Pos. Time% of Possession
HPK 163 11.4s 31m 57.60%
Tappara 164 8.34s 22m47s 42.40%
HPK 183 9.33s 28m20s 51.7%
HIFK 189 8.55s 26m36s 48.3%
HPK 202 8.82s 29m42s 55.6%
Ässät 212 6.70s 23m42s 44.4%
HPK 188 9.59s 30m03s 54.7%
Magnitogorsk 178 8.33s 24m43s 45.3%
Average Pos Median Pos Mode Pos
Game 1 HPK-Magnit. (366 pos) 8.98 6 1
Game 2 HPK-HIFK (372 pos) 8.89 6 1
Game 3 HPK – Ässät (414 pos) 7.73 6 1
Game 4 HPK – Tappara (327 pos) 9.9 6 1
All Possessions (1479 pos) 8.81 6 1
Figure 4. Possession length of  scoring chances at different strengths
While the average length of  all possessions measured was 8.81 seconds, the average length of  a 
possession that produced a scoring chance (SC) was 12.59 seconds.  The Even-Strength scoring 
chances (EVSC) averaged 10.94 seconds, and the Even-strength chances from counter-attacks 
(CAEV) were even shorter, at an average of  6.83 seconds.  The precipitous drop in length of  SC 
was due to the fact that 55-60% of  Power Play goals are scored after possessions of  more than 10 
seconds  (Saarinen,  Mensonen  & Small  2009,  20).   Furthermore,  CAEV tend  to  come from 
possessions of  under 6 seconds (Ibid.).  But simply knowing the length of  the final possession 
before a scoring chance is of  little use to a coach or analyst, because scoring chances are not 
standalone events.   Scoring chances are the culmination of  the possessions that come before 
them.  Each scoring chance has a story, a history, that creates the circumstances from which it 
arises.  And, somewhat surprisingly, merely having more possession time does not increase the 
likelihood of  producing scoring chances.  The following figure 5 depicts the total percent of  
possession in a game per team, as well as their scoring chances for that game. 
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Figure 5. Scoring chances in relation to possession. 
There is not a strong correlation between total total possession time and scoring chances.  In two 
of  the games (HPKv Tappara, HPK v Magnitogorsk) the team with more possession time also 
had more scoring chances.  In the other two games, however, the team with less possession time 
had more scoring chances.  So,  if  overall  possession time has little  correlation to number of  
scoring chances, does percentage of  possession in the minutes and seconds prior to a scoring 
chance have any influence?
5.3  Examining the 10 possessions prior to a scoring chance
To answer that question, it is necessary to observe the possessions prior to the scoring chances. 
By examining the 10 possessions prior to each of  the 189 scoring chances tabulated in this study, 
it may be possible to recognize some patterns.  The following figure 6 depicts the average total 
length of  possession for both teams prior to a scoring chance.  For instance, if  Tappara and HPK 
each had the puck 5 times before HPK's scoring chance, and each time they had the puck, they 
retained control for 5 seconds, the total length of  those 10 possessions was 50 seconds .
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Figure 6.  Length of  10 possessions before scoring chance, in seconds
The average length of  those 10 possessions before the scoring chance was 94.3 seconds at all 
strengths  and 88.7  seconds  at  even strength.   Note,  however,  that  in  two of  the  games,  the 
average 10 possessions before even strength scoring chances were actually longer than the average 
10 possessions before All Strength scoring chances.
The most striking numbers (and the ones with the greatest implications for coaches) concern the 
percentage  of  possession  prior  to  scoring  chances.    As  earlier  figures  in  this  study  have 
demonstrated, overall possession percentages do not relate directly to quantity of  scoring chances. 
A team may possess the puck, over the course of  an entire game, up to 15% more time than its 
opponent, and still get fewer scoring chances.  However, as the following figure 7 demonstrates, in 
the 10 possessions prior to a scoring chance, on average, the attacking team has the puck more 
than 50% of  the total time.  This is true regardless of  whether the measurement was made for 
scoring  chances  at  All  Strengths,  Even  Strength,  or  only  for  Even  Strength  Counter-Attack 
chances.
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Figure 7.  Percent of  total possession time in 10 possessions prior to scoring chance by attacking 
team
These numbers show conclusively that scoring chances are not based solely on creating quick 
counter-attacks, but on possessing the puck in the in the minutes before the quick counter-attack. 
In every game and overall, scoring chances occur at a time when the attacking team has possessed 
the puck over 50% of  the time in the prior 10 possessions.  
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6.  Discussion
The information collected in this study reveals that although previous studies of  scoring chances 
have been correct, they have not necessarily given a complete picture of  scoring chances and the 
circumstances that precipitate them.  While it has become common knowledge over the years that 
most even-strength scoring chances come from fast counter-attacks in the Offensive and Neutral 
Zones, the research has left many with the mistaken impression that such events are standalone 
occurrences.  Thus, many coaches have trained their players to move the puck forward, quickly, in 
the hope of  producing a scoring chance within the 'key', fast-attack window.  Examples of  this 
adherence to 'common knowledge' are plentiful in coaching literature.  According to Perron, “The 
key ingredients of  a counter-attack are surprise and quickness” (Perron, 161).  When a defensive 
player gains the puck from attackers, he should, according to this philosophy, attempt to advance 
the puck as quickly as possible:
This  quick  forward pass  will  most  likely  create  a  numerical 
advantage.   The  defenseman  could  have  chosen  to  pass 
laterally; this would not have produced a quick transition...you 
don't want to give the opposition time to recover their ideal 
defensive alignment (Perron, 161).
Ryan Walter, Head Coach of  Canada's National Women's Team, and former NHL coach agrees. 
“It is important to practice counters with speed.  When a team counters, the intent is to catch the 
opponent moving toward the offensive zone and then quickly pass the puck up to the forwards 
and hopefully get an odd-man rush” (Walter 18).
Knowing, however, that creating the right environment for a good counter attack (one that results 
in a scoring chance) requires your team to have the puck more than 50% of  the time on the final 
10 possessions might change some coaches' philosophies on when to keep the puck, and when to 
relinquish, or dump it.
Antti  Pennanen,  Head  Coach  of  the  Hämeenlinna  Pallo  Kerho  A-Juniors  has  a  different 
philosophy on dumping the puck from his North American counterparts.  To Pennanen, the puck 
should only be dumped when his team has maneuvered itself  into a good position to immediately 
win it back.  That is to say, to Pennanen, dumping is not a defensive 'safe' action, but one that is 
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the culmination of  longer possessions aimed at disorganizing and disrupting the opposition's 
defense.  
This philosophy could prove to be a boon to Finnish hockey at the international level.  For too 
long, Finland has been trying to beat Canada and the US at their own game.  Finland has tried to 
play with fast transitions, dumping the puck into the opponent's zone, then forechecking to win 
the puck back.  The problem, however, is that North Americans are, on average, bigger, stronger 
and faster than their Finnish counterparts.  Furthermore, North American junior coaches focus 
on playing a physical brand of  hockey (full-ice, hard pressure and body checking) that is  not 
familiar in Finland.  Canada and the US have players who are fast, strong and hit well.  Why, then, 
does Finland attempt to play in a way that makes it easy for those teams to do the very things, and 
exploit the very strengths that make them so successful?
Advantage should be taken of  this new information.  If  coaches embrace the facts, rather than 
blindly follow conventional wisdom, they will develop new tactical approaches to hockey.  These 
new approaches will accept and build on the idea that the most effective attacks – counter-attacks 
– are produced by previous lengthy possessions.  
The Game's underdogs can succeed against bigger, stronger opponents – but only if  they choose 
to flout the conventional wisdom and play a different style of  hockey.  Possession Hockey.
6.1  Thesis Process
This  thesis  project  is  but  a  beginning.   To better  analyze  the  nature  of  possessions, 
possession  time,  and  scoring  chances  would  require  a  quantity  of  research  that  cannot  be 
accomplished by one person working alone.  An interesting continuation to this research, then, 
might have the Degree Programme students in Vierumäki continue the research.  They should 
develop new questions or premises, and examine an entire season's worth or tournament's worth 
of  games to see if  the results hold up.
This research is by no means flawless.  The researcher is not much of  a “numbers person” 
and, as such, struggled mightily to produce something useful from reams and reams of  statistics. 
If  there exists a person who would be more capable of  analyzing the statistics collected, let him 
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or her step forward and have at.
The study initially involved information from 22 periods of  play, but the results from 9 of  
those periods (3 full games) were discarded because of  issues of  accuracy.  The games were not 
actually filmed by the researcher, but rather by volunteer staff  who were, at times, less than reliable. 
The videographers would often, apparently, stop filming the games before the actual end of  play, 
or would arrive back in the arena up to 5 minutes after the commencement of  play.  Thus, any 
results garnered from those incomplete videos were unusable.  Without full video of  a period, it 
is impossible to generalize any results taken from the available portion of  that period.  Thus, the 
decision  was  made  to  abandon  the  partial  periods.   Despite  the  loss  of  that  information, 
important results and conclusions have still been garnered from the 189 scoring chances and 1479 
possessions that remain.  
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Appendix 1.  Transition and puck possession in a single game
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